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Abstract
We analyze an approach to managing the COVID-19 pandemic with-
out shutting down the economy while staying within the capacity of the
healthcare system. We base our analysis on a detailed heterogeneous epi-
demiological model, which takes into account different population groups
and phases of the disease, including incubation, infection period, hos-
pitalization, and treatment in the intensive care unit (ICU). We model
the healthcare capacity as the total number of hospital and ICU beds
for the whole country. We calibrate the model parameters to data re-
ported in several recent research papers. For high- and low-risk popula-
tion groups, we calculate the number of total and intensive care hospi-
talizations, and deaths as functions of time. The main conclusion is that
countries, which enforce reasonable hygienic measures on time can avoid
lockdowns throughout the pandemic provided that the number of spare
ICU beds per million is above the threshold of about 100. In countries
where the total number of ICU beds is below this threshold, a limited
period quarantine to specific high-risk groups of the population suffices.
Furthermore, in the case of an inadequate capacity of the healthcare sys-
tem, we incorporate a feedback loop and demonstrate that quantitative
impact of the lack of ICU units on the death curve. In the case of in-
adequate ICU beds, full- and partial-quarantine scenarios outcomes are
almost identical, making it unnecessary to shut down the whole economy.
We also study a more detailed model with four groups, namely, children,
low-risk adults, high-risk adults, and nursing home occupants, which are
considered very high risk. We conclude that schools’ opening does not
increase the risk of over-capacity of the health system or the chance for
a second wave, provided that the rest of the population behaves respon-
sibly. On the other hand, the risk from nursing homes to over-capacity
∗Original version published on arXiv on April 21, 2020.
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and death rates requires special attention to avoid a high infection rate
among this group.
1 Introduction
Pandemics are nothing new and have been afflicting humankind since prehistoric
times. Rather than starting with the obligatory references to the Black Death,
which devastated Europe in the fourteenth century and killed about 30% to 60%
of Europe’s population, we briefly mention some of the flu pandemics of the last
hundred and thirty years, see [3]:
(a) The “Russian Flu” or “Asiatic Flu,” 1889-1890, was caused by either
H3N8 or H2N2 virus. The “Russian Flu” had a very high attack and mortality
rates, with around a million fatalities worldwide;
(b) The “Spanish Flu,” 1918.1919, was caused by the H1N1 virus and con-
sidered to be the most severe pandemic in recent history. The “Spanish Flu”
had rapidly spread on all continents to become a worldwide pandemic, which
eventually infected about 500 million people, comprising one-third of the world’s
population. Being unusually deadly and virulent, it killed at least 50 million
worldwide, with about 675,000 deaths occurring in the US;
(c) The “Asian Flu,” 1957.58, was caused by an H2N2 virus. Similarly to
the “Russian Flu,” it caused about 1.1 million deaths worldwide and 116,000 in
the US;
(d) The “Hong Kong Flu,” 1968-72, was caused by an H3N2 virus. It killed
approximately one million people worldwide and about 100,000 - in the US;
(e) The “Swine Flu,” 2009.10, was caused by an H1N1 virus and killed up
to 500,000 people worldwide and approximately 13,000 in the US.
In theory, authorities can arrest an epidemic by quarantining all the popula-
tion for a prolonged period, provided that such quarantine is technically feasible.
However, the economic and social price of such quarantine is too much to bear,
not to mention its decisively medieval nature. Expected consequences include
the destruction of the economy, enormous unemployment, and social and health
aspects of quarantine, such as isolation and loneliness, drug abuse, and domestic
violence, not to mention hunger and social unrest.
Historically, pandemics tend to attack the group, which is generally per-
ceived as low-risk, such as young and healthy, more than elder people, who
are usually viewed as vulnerable. For example, during the “Spanish Flu” and
the “Swine Flu,” younger and healthier individuals were in greater danger than
senior citizens. In contrast, COVID-19 attacks the elderly population much
more aggressively than the younger ones, in line with the common flu. (In
all pandemics and epidemics, people with pre-existing conditions belong to the
high-risk group.) Therefore, the response and pandemic preparedness efforts
should not be primarily based on the previously used measures but must be
modeled based on the new reality on the ground.
At the same time, the most recent pandemic of 2010 provided a lot of useful
epidemiological insights, including statistically proven the effectiveness of face
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masks as an essential prevention tool. Several authors showed that wearing face
masks reduced the rate of infection for such respiratory transmitted infections
as swine flu, see, e.g., [5, 6, 7].
Current epidemiological models are based on the simplistic assumption that
the population responds the same way to the pandemic. However, COVID-19
has a remarkably different impact on high- and low-risk individuals. We de-
scribe the dynamic of disease for each group, or factor, and include interactions
between them to create a close to a reality model.
In this article, we present a detailed and rich epidemiological multi-factor
model. Our model accounts for different phases of the disease, potential aquisi-
tion of the herd immunity,multiple groups in the populations, and the interaction
between individuals belonging to various groups. Our model treats the health
system as given and accounts for such aspects as the availability of extra hospital
beds and intensive care units (ICU) to accommodate the pent-up demand due
to the pandemic. We use the most recent research data to calibrate the model.
The model allows simulating lockdowns and quarantines of each specific group
and the response of different groups to mandatory social behavior in public.
First, we need to agree on the ultimate purpose of the lockdowns. If they
are implemented to buy time until pharmaceutical companies find a vaccine or
medical professionals introduce efficient treatments, they can potentially pro-
tect people from dying of COVID-19. However, such an approach will lead to
economic mayhem, with many people dying from the consequences of economic
and financial destruction.
If, on the other hand, the purpose of the lockdowns is to ensure that the
pandemic spreads slowly, with a reduced epidemic peak (flattening the curve),
then a very different strategy is needed. Flattening the curve is particularly
important if the healthcare system has limited capacity (especially in terms of
medical personnel and intensive care units, ICUs.) Such an approach can lead
to reduced mortality, even if the total number of infections remains the same.
In either case, the critical point is to set a goal and develop a strategy of
achieving it. Merely being on the safe side does not represent a viable approach
because the objective function of policymakers should include other health is-
sues, as well as society as a whole.
Our conclusion is predicated on the widespread implementation of sensible
pandemic response measures, such as wearing face masks, following strict hy-
giene routine, social distancing, paid self-quarantine, and ongoing surveillance
via testing and possibly phone tracking. Authorities can enforce such measures
by imposing fines for violations of the regime and help employers to provide
paid leave related to quarantines.
Moreover, to reduce transmission of the disease, readily available reliable
testing comes to the fore. This sensible approach is especially appropriate for
such essential parts of the infrastructure, like healthcare, police, food process-
ing, and the likes. Fast and efficient tests improve the detection of infected
people and prevent further SARS-CoV-2 transmission, reducing, thereby, the
reproductive number, see Section 2.
Of course, testing for antibodies and issuing a clean bill of health (provided
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that the virus immunity is real) to the individuals, who have recovered from the
virus, can also be of great help.
Besides, in many metropolitan areas, transportation, especially during the
rush hour, is one of the biggest, if not the biggest, source of infection. To
alleviate the transportation burden and prevent crowding during lunch breaks,
staggering work hours, extending the workweek, allowing people to work from
home on alternating days, and other similar measures, are obviously helpful.
The main conclusion of this paper is that in countries where the majority
of the population abides by the sensible rules and regulations, the economy
can continue functioning. At the same time, the health system can expand
to manage the additional patient load. We feel that schools’ opening does
not increase the risk of over-capacity of the health system or the chance for a
second wave, provided that the rest of the population behaves responsibly. On
the other hand, the risk from nursing homes to over-capacity and death rates
requires special attention to avoid a high infection rate among this group.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a K-
group version of the basic Kermack–McKendrick model with a generic preferred
mixing matrix. We specify the model for the most important case of two groups
(the high-risk and low-risk groups) in Section 3. In Section 4, we consider the
four-group case, the groups being children, low-risk adults, high-risk adults,
and occupants of nursing homes. An a priori choice of the model parameters is
hard to accomplish because the actual number of people infected by the virus is
unknown due to the prevalence of asymptomatic cases. To address this problem,
we do “implied” calibration of the model by choosing parameters in such a way
that observable quantities, such as the number of hospitalizations, including ICU
admissions, and, deaths rates are reproduced with reasonable accuracy. This
calibration is described in Section 5. In Section 6 we formulate and graphically
illustrate our main results. We draw our main conclusions in Section 7.
2 A heterogeneous SEIR model with K groups
The famous Kermack–McKendrick model is the prime working horse of epidemi-
ology, see, e.g., [1, 2]. Depending on the particulars of the disease under consid-
eration, one can use either susceptible-infected-removed (SIR), or susceptible-
exposed-infected-removed (SEIR), or a more complex model. The salient fea-
tures of COVID-19, however, make it imperative to use a more advanced version
of the model, which, at the very least, should account for two groups of suscep-
tibles - a high-risk group, and a low-risk group, see, e.g., [4]. This separation is
a must because the average mortality rate, which is of the order of 0.4 percent
or so, see, [10], is not a good representation of actual mortality, which is man-
ifestly bimodal. Besides, the model should involve the all-important feedback
loop, which accounts for the fact that mortality increases when the demand
for intensive care outstrips its supply so that rationing becomes inevitable and
results in elevated mortality.
We separate the population in K groups. Let Nk be the number of people
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in the k-th group, and ak is the average number of contacts per person per unit
of time. Conditional on data availability, this approach allows us to model the
pandemic on a more granular level, accounting for varying vulnerability levels,
different population densities in metropolitan areas within a country or different
areas within a given city, demographics, and the likes.
The critical assumption is that the number of contacts between members of
the k-th and k′-th group, per unit of time is given by
Ckk′ =
pikδkk′ + (1− pik) (1−pik′ )ak′Nk′∑K
k′=1
(1−pik′ )ak′Nk′
 akNk, (1)
where δkk′ is the Kronecker symbol. Here pi = (pi1, ..., piK), 0 ≤ pik ≤ 1, is a
vector, which characterizes the relative size of interactions within and outside
of the k-th group. The matrix C = (Ckl) has rank one when pik = 0, which
corresponds to proportional mixing, while it has a diagonal form for pik = 1,
which corresponds to no mixing between the groups, caused, for example, by
cultural preferences, or a lockdown. The matrix C is called the preferred mixing
matrix.
A given group is subdivided into susceptibles, exposed, infected, hospitalized,
moved to the intesive care unit (and put on ventilator), recovered, and dead,
Sk, Ek, Ik, Hk, Vk, Rk, Dk, respectively. Such classification corresponds to
different phases of the disease. In what follows, we use the data points from
[8, 9].
The population in the k-th class, which is not infected at time t forms the
susceptible group; with the number of susceptible individuals denoted by Sk.
The first phase of the disease starts when a susceptible individual becomes
exposed via a contact with an infectious individual, but does not show symptoms
and cannot yet infect others. We assume that, on average, a representative
individual is exposed for τE days until she can infect others. Typically, τE = 4.6
days. We denote the number of exposed people in the k-th class at time t by
Ek(t).
The next phase begins when an exposed individual becomes infected. We
denote the number of infected individuals in the k-th class k as Ik(t). Every
exposed individual stays infected τ I days. Typically, τ I = 4 days. At this stage,
infected people transmit the disease, regardless of exhibiting symptoms or being
asymptomatic.
During the next phase, a certain percentage of the infected individuals re-
quires hospitalizations, depending on their risk group. Without hospitalization,
the probability of recovery or death is β
(R)
k and β
(D)
k , respectively. We denote
the number of hospitalized individuals in the k-th class at time t as Hk(t) and
the probability of hospitalization β
(H)
k . On average, an individual stays in the
hospital for τH days before they are either moved to the ICU or recover. Typi-
cally, τH = 7 days. The probability of recovery or death without being moved
to intensive care is γ
(R)
k and γ
(D)
k , respectively.
A certain percentage of severely ill hospitalized individuals must be moved
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to an ICU; this percentage depends on the class (risk group) they belong to. The
number of individuals from the k-th class staying at the ICU is Vk(t) and the
probability that a hospitalized individual requires the ICU treatment is γ
(V )
k .
The average time in the ICU is τV days. Typically, τV = 10 days. For
individuals receiving the ICU treatment, the probability to return to the regular
hospital is δ
(H)
k , and the probability of dying is δ
(D)
k , respectively. We denote by
Rk(t) and Dk(t) the numbers of individuals in the k-th class who have recovered
or died until time t, respectively.
The corresponding ODEs have the form
dSk
dt = −akΘkSk,
dEk
dt = akΘkSk − 1τEEk,
dIk
dt =
1
τE
Ek − 1τI Ik,
dHk
dt =
β
(H)
k
τI
Ik +
δ
(H)
k
τV
Vk − 1τHHk,
dVk
dt =
γ(V )
τV
Hk − 1τV Vk,
dRk
dt =
β
(R)
k
τI
Ik +
γ
(R)
k
τH
Hk,
dDk
dt =
β
(D)
k
τI
Ik +
γ
(D)
k
τH
Hk +
δ
(D)
k
τV
Vk,
dNk
dt = −
(
β
(D)
k
τI
Ik +
γ
(D)
k
τH
Hk +
δ
(D)
k
τV
Vk
)
.
(2)
Here the transitional coefficients are inversely proportional to the average time
spent by a representative individual in different states, τE , τ I , τH , τV .
The all-important quantity in Eqs (2)Θk depends on vector pi = (pi1, ..., piK),
which characterizes the intensity of interactions for the members of the k-th
group and is given by
Θk = pik
Ik
Nk
+ (1− pik) Ω,
Ω =
∑K
k′=1
(1−pik′ )ak′Ik′∑K
k′=1
(1−pik′ )ak′Nk′
.
(3)
It is chosen to be in agreement with Eq. (1).
By construction, Eqs (2) satisfy the conservation laws
d
dt (Sk + Ek + Ik +Hk + Vk +Rk −Nk) = 0,
d
dt (Dk +Nk) = 0.
(4)
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Eqs (2) have to be supplied with the initial conditions. We choose these
conditions in the form
Sk (0) = (1− ξk)Nk, Ek (0) = ξkNk, Ik (0) = 0, Hk (0) = 0,
Vk (0) = 0, Rk (0) = 0, Dk (0) = 0, Nk (0) = Nk,
(5)
where Nk is the initial number of individuals in their respecitve class, while ξk
is the fraction of the population initially exposed to the virus. In principle, it
can be as small as 1/Nk - the proverbial “patient zero.”
The flowchart for Eqs (2) is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 near here.
We note in passing that by choosing values independent of k for all the
relevant quantities and putting pik = 0, we can convert the model into the
particular case of the single group.
According to [8, 9], the rough estimates for timing parameters are as follows
τE = 4.6 days, τ I = 4 days, τH = 7 days, τV = 10 days. (6)
The actual process in assigning population to varous risk groups is relatively
involved. We discuss it in the Section 3 for the most relevant and practical case
of high- and low-risk groups, K = 2.
We note in passing that the way Eqs (2), (3) are manifestly scale-invariant.
In other words, the increase in the overall population leads to a proportional
increase in the number of beds and deaths.However, in large metropolitan cen-
ters, it is more appropriate to choose Θk in the form which violates scaling
symmetry:
Θ
(ω)
k = pik
Ik
N1−$k
+ (1− pik) Ω($),
Ω($) =
∑K
k′=1
(1−pik′ )ak′Ik′∑K
k′=1
(1−pik′ )ak′N1−$k′
,
(7)
where $ is the factor accounting for the size of the metropolitan area of interest
and modes of human interactions that are specific to large urban areas, such as
an extensive public transportation system. A detailed analysis will be presented
elsewhere.
It is critical to realize that the ICU capacity is finite, and model it as such,
hence
δ
(H)
k = δ¯
(H)
k H
(
C −
∑K
k′=1
Vk′
)
,
δ
(D)
k = δ¯
(D)
k + δ¯
(H)
k
(
1−H
(
C −
∑K
k′=1
Vk′
))
.
(8)
where H (.) is the Heaviside step function. The celebrated reproductive number
ρk is defined as
ρk = τ Iak, (9)
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This number represents a measure of transmissibility but has no clear theoretical
meaning. Therefore, instead, we use common sense and calibrate it to the
available data. Eq. (9) shows that reproductive number for the k-th class is
proportional to the number of contacts per unit of time, ak over the duration
of the infectious stage. In other words, ak represents the tendency of infected
individuals from the k-th class to infect other individuals either from their own
class or other classes.
We model the lockdown by the proportional reduction of the coefficients
ρk (t), where the time-dependence represents seasonality and potential switching
of lockdowns on and off:
ρk (t) = φk (t)χk (t) ρ
(0)
k , (10)
with
φk (t) =
∑L
l=1
φ¯k,lH ((t− tl−1) (tl − t)) ,
χk (t) = 1 + ϑk cos
(
2pit
T
)
.
(11)
Here we assume that ρ
(0)
k is the “natural” reproductive number specific to
COVID-19, ϑk corresponds to its seasonal variations, T0 = 0, T1...TL−1, TL = T ,
T is the terminal time for the calculation, e.g. T = 365 days, and T1...TL−1 are
times when lockdown policies are changed. In the simplest case of a one-time
lockdown, we have L = 3; T1 is the time when the quarantine is imposed, T2 is
the time when it is lifted, T3 = T . More generally, there can be several rounds
of switching the quarantine policies on and off.
Expressed in terms of ρk (t), Eqs (3), (9) become
Θk = pik
Ik
Nk
+ (1− pik) Ω,
Ω =
∑K
k′=1
(1−pik′ )ρk′ (t)Ik′∑K
k′=1
(1−pik′ )ρk′ (t)Nk′
,
(12)
Θ
($)
k = pik
Ik
N1−$k
+ (1− pik) Ω($),
Ω($) =
∑K
k′=1
(1−pik′ )ρk′ (t)Ik′∑K
k′=1
(1−pik′ )ρk′ (t)N1−$k′
.
(13)
Assuming that the reproductive number is constant, ρk (t) = ρ¯k, so that
there is no seasonality and no interventions, we can calculate the asymptotic
fractions of the population, which is unaffected by the pandemic by the time
it runs its course. To put it differently, this is the level at which the herd
immunity plays its magic. Let sk = Sk (∞) /Sk (0). When k = 1 (one group),
it is a well-known fact that s1 satisfies the following transcendent equation
ln (s1) + ρ¯1 (1− s1) = 0, (14)
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see, e.g., [1, 2]. When k = 2 (two groups), a similar result can be found in [4],
see below. Finally, in the general case, the transcendent equations for the vector
s = (s1, ..., sK) have the form:
ln (sk) + ρ¯k
∑K
k′=1
ηkk′ (1− sk′) = 0, (15)
where
ηkk′ = pikδkk′ + (1− pik) ρk′ N˜k′∑K
k′′=1
ρk′′ N˜k′′
,
N˜k = (1− pik)Nk.
(16)
The asymptotic values (s1, ..., sK) can be used to get an estimate of the to-
tal number of deaths for a given set of reproductive numbers (ρ¯1, ..., ρ¯K) and
mortality rates (µ1, ..., µK), provided that authorities do not apply mitigating
measures:
Dk = µk (1− sk)Nk. (17)
3 The 2-SEIR model
For our purposes, it is natural to divide the population into high- and low-risk
groups defined by their reaction to infection, K = 2. These groups have com-
pletely different probabilities of being exposed, hospitalized, moved to the ICU,
and dying. The two groups are healthy (low-risk, LR, k = 1) and vulnerable
(high-risk, HR, k = 2) populations. Age is an important, but not the only, de-
terminant of the group. Other factors, such as pre-exising conditions, obesity,
etc. are also essential.
In the two-group case, original Eqs (2) can be simplified as follows
dS1
dt = − ρ1τI Θ1S1,
dE1
dt =
ρ1
τI
Θ1S1 − 1τEE1,
dI1
dt =
1
τE
E1 − 1τI I1,
dH1
dt =
β
(H)
1
τI
I1 +
δ
(H)
1
τV
V1 − 1τHH1,
dV1
dt =
γ
(V )
1
τH
H1 − 1τV V1,
dR1
dt =
β
(R)
1
τI
I1 +
γ
(R)
1
τH
H1,
dD1
dt =
β
(D)
1
τI
I1 +
γ
(D)
1
τH
H1 +
δ
(D)
1
τV
V1,
dN1
dt = −
(
β
(D)
1
τI
I1 +
γ
(D)
1
τH
H1 +
δ
(D)
1
τV
V1
)
,
(18)
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dS2
dt = − ρ2τI Θ2S2,
dE2
dt =
ρ2
τI
Θ2S2 − 1τEE2,
dI2
dt =
1
τE
E2 − 1τI I2,
dH2
dt =
β
(H)
2
τI
I2 +
δ
(H)
2
τV
V2 − 1τHH2,
dV2
dt =
γ
(V )
2
τH
H2 − 1τV V2,
dR2
dt =
β
(R)
2
τI
I2 +
γ
(R)
2
τH
H2,
dD2
dt =
β
(D)
2
τI
I2 +
γ
(D)
2
τH
H2 +
δ
(D)
2
τV
V2,
dN2
dt = −
(
β
(D)
2
τI
I2 +
γ
(D)
2
τH
H2 +
δ
(D)
2
τV
V2
)
,
(19)
where
Θ1 = pi1
I1
N1
+ (1− pi1) Ω,
Θ2 = pi2
I2
N2
+ (1− pi2) Ω,
Ω = (1−pi1)a1I1+(1−pi2)a2I2(1−pi1)a1N1+(1−pi2)a2N2
(20)
δ
(H)
1 = δ¯
(H)
1 H (C − V1 − V2) , δ(D)1 = δ¯(D)1 + δ¯(H)1 (1−H (C − V1 − V2)) ,
δ
(R)
2 = δ¯
(H)
2 H (C − V1 − V2) , δ(D)2 = δ¯(D)2 + δ¯(H)2 (1−H (C − V1 − V2)) .
(21)
Thus, Eqs (18), (19) are connected via Θ1, Θ2, and V = V1 + V2.
The two-factor version of Eq. (15), which can be used to calculate the
asymptotic fractions of the population, which is unaffected by the pandemic
has the form: ln (s1) + ρ¯1
((
pi1 +
(1−pi1)ρ¯1N˜1
ρ¯1N˜1+ρ¯2N˜2
)
(1− s1) + (1−pi1)ρ¯2N˜2ρ¯1N˜1+ρ¯2N˜2 (1− s2)
)
= 0,
ln (s2) + ρ¯2
(
(1−pi2)ρ¯1N˜1
ρ¯1N˜1+ρ¯2N˜2
(1− s1) +
(
pi2 +
(1−pi2)ρ¯2N˜2
ρ¯1N˜1+ρ¯2N˜2
)
(1− s2)
)
= 0,
(22)
where N˜k = (1− pik)Nk, k = 1, 2. We show (s1, s2) as functions of (ρ¯1, ρ¯2) for
representative (pi1 = 0.9, pi2 = 0.7) in Figure 2.
Figure 2 near here.
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4 The 4-SIER Model
The 2-group model we presented in the previous section improves the pre-
dictability of the pandemic dramatically compared to the simplistic one-group
model. However, in many countries, it is imperative to include further groups
and increase the granularity of the population in the model to improve the ef-
ficacy of the model. One has to choose the number of groups depending on
the characteristics of the disease under consideration. In the case of COVID-
19 naturally, there are two other groups to consider: Children and population
in nursery/retirement homes. Children are at a lower risk of severe morbidity
mortality. Several researchers argued that children are typically less infectious
than adults. Based on many countries’ experience, the disease spreads out ex-
tremely fast in nursery/retirement homes, which are semi-confined groups and
yet include in its majority high or even very high-risk population. One can
extract a lot of information about the NH group, since a high proportion of
the people consuming ICU beds and dying come from the nursery/retirement
homes. Hence with a 4-group model, we can also improve the partial quarantine
strategy to include more specific populations and calculate the effect of closing
and opening schools.
Our 4-group model are as follows:
1. Children with no chronic illnesses (C).
2. Adults aged less than 65 years without chronic diseases, low risk (LR).
3. Adults aged 65 years and all the younger population with chronic illnesses,
high risk (HR).
4. People in nursing/retirement homes (NH).
Typically, the ratio of this population is known roughly in every country.
We denote the four groups by C,LR,HR,NH.
Going to eq. (2), now k = 1, 2, 3, 4. Ostensibly, we need to calibrate twice
as many parameters as before and find β(k), γ(k), δ(k) for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, instead
of k = 1, 2. Fortunately, this is not exactly the case. We know that children’s
hospitalizations are exceedingly rare, while their death rate is almost null. We
can get some indication of the parameters for nursing/retirement homes from
the “Corona” boat that docked in Japan for a few weeks. The calibration allows
us actually to estimate the infection rate of children since, in most countries,
they are rarely tested and seldomly hospitalized. If we, therefore, assume that
the national measured reproduction rate most likely ignores children, then the
reproduction rate of children as a group (e.g., in schools and nursery gardens)
can be approximated quite accurately.
To demonstrate the power of the 4-group model in decision making, let us
consider a small country like Israel, with a population of 9.1 million people. The
four groups, k = 1, 2, 3, 4, are:
1. k = 1 - 1 million Children with no background diseases.
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2. k = 2 - 6.5 million Adults with no background diseases with age less than
65.
3. k = 3 - 1.5 million Elderly population above age 65 and young population
with background diseases.
4. k = 4 - 100,000 People in nursery/retirement homes.
While the NH group is only 10% of the size of the HR group, it affects
the ICU consumption significantly, because, being a closed place, nursing home
inhabitants have a much higher reproductive rate than the general population,
unless nursing homes are thoroughly isolated.
The C group has a significant effect as well since it is a ‘hidden’ group in
terms of hospitalization but might affect the spread-out of the disease signifi-
cantly.
5 Calibration
We calibrate the model to recent clinical data and mortality statistics, [8, 9, 11].
The idea is that some parameters of the model, such as the reproductive rates ρ,
and the specific times τE (possibly), τ I , τH , τV , can be observed from clinical
observations. This is also true for γ and δ. Finding β is more difficult because its
proper evaluation is predicated on knowing the number of infected individuals,
which is unobservable. Our strategy is to calibrate it to observables, such as
the number of hospitalizations, ICU hospitalizations, and deaths. For example,
given our previous discussion, we can choose the coefficients β, γ, δ, pi for Sweden
as shown in Table 1.
Table 1 near hear.
Here 1→ LR, 2→ HR. This choice results in the following mortality rates for
the LR and HR groups p
(D)
1,2 and p
(D) for the population as a whole:
p
(D)
1 = 0.83%, p
(D)
2 = 1.01%, p
(D) = 0.21%. (23)
Although these estimates are a little lower than some of the current projections,
they fit the actual pattern on the ground well.
For the four-group case, we choose parameters as shown in Table 2.
Table 2 near here.
Here 1→ C, 2→ LR, 3→ HR, 4→ NH.
6 Results
In this section, we use parameters given in Table 1 with the reproductive num-
bers ρ1 (t), ρ2 (t) corresponding to the situation in Sweden and in Israel, and
analyze several different strategies for dealing with the pandemic.
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In Figure 3, we show the dynamic of the disease in Sweden corresponding to
parameters givenin Table 1 and
ρ1 = 1.50, ρ2 = 1.40, (24)
so that there is no seasonality. It is clear from Figure 3(a) that the asymptotic
fractions of the population, which is unaffected by the pandemic, given by Eqs
(22) agree with our calculations entirely.
Figure 3 near here.
In Figure 4, we show the dynamic of the disease in Sweden corresponding to
the same parameters, but with seasonality accounted for:
ρ1 = 1.55(1 + 0.2 cos
(
2pit
365
)
, ρ2 = 1.45(1 + 0.2 cos
(
2pit
365
)
. (25)
No quarantine is imposed. The number of ICU units is sufficient to satisfy the
entire demand.
Figure 4 near here.
In Figure 5 we show the dynamic of the disease in Israel, with the quarantine
imposed after 30 days and kept for 45 days. The “natural” reproductive numbers
for both groups are given by
ρk (t) = 1.3
(
1 + 0.2 cos
(
2pit
365
))
. (26)
It is reduced by 30% during the quarantine period. The number of ICU beds is
1250 is sufficient to satisfy the demand.
Figure 5 near here.
In Figure 6 we show the dynamic of the disease with the same parameters
as before, but with 600 ICU beds. The spike in mortality caused by the ICU
rationing is visible.
Figure 6 near here.
In Figures 7, 8, 9, we analyze three approaches to exiting the quarantine. In
Figure 7, we assume that the HR group is left in the quarantine indefinitely,
while the LR group is not restricted. Figure 8, we assume that both groups are
left in the quarantine indefinitely (however improbable such an assumption is).
Finally, in the most promising 9, we show what happens when both groups are
released from the quarantine. Still, strict disease mitigation is pursued, allowing
to reduce the reproductive numbers by 20%.
Figure 7 near here.
Figure 8 near here.
Figure 9 near here.
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In Figure 10, we show disease dynamics in Israel for the four-group model,
with sufficient number of ICU beds. We assume that R0 is constant, R0 =
(1.1, 1.3, 1.1, 1.1).
Figure 10 near here.
In Figures 11, 12, we show the hospital and ICU utilization with the same
parameters as in Figure 5, for different choices of the reproductive numbers.
Similarly, in Figure 12, we present the total number of deaths.
Figure 11 near here.
Figure 12 near here.
7 Conclusions
In this article, we develop a flexible multi-group framework for analyzing the
consequences of pandemics with various quarantine regimes. We compute the
extra capacity of the healthcare system, which is required to absorb all ill and
severely ill patients. Our analysis can easily include several interacting groups.
However, to achieve our goal in the most efficient way, we focus on the case
of two groups only - the high-risk and low-risk populations - and examine the
dynamics of the infection spread. We also study the impact of transmission
on the overall healthcare system and demonstrate that the result varies quite
dramatically depending on the chosen strategies.
For a given level of parameters of the pandemic and the size of the health
care system, we define the dynamics of the disease, including the number of
infections, hospitalizations, ICU admissions, recoveries and deaths.
We extend the SEIR model to incorporate the two population groups. We
demonstrate that treating two groups as the same brings no additional benefit
(at least in the case of Israel) while causing significant economic suffering.
Assuming that the population abides by pandemic public health counter-
measures, thereby effectively reducing transmission of the disease, and given
the health system capacity at or above the threshold, the country can impose
no quarantine at all. Examples include Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Sweden. None of them enforced any lockdown, which is consistent with our
results.
Social distancing reducing the reproductive number in big cities can be en-
forced by making changes in the work hours and practicing staggering. These
changes naturally lessen the burden on public transportation during rush hours
and reduce crowding during lunch breaks. For example, even offices and schools
can operate in shifts, while weekends can become floating.
Our analysis is useful in countries with high levels of compliance with hy-
gienic and social distance measures. If the capacity of the health system is large
enough, and the number of hospital or ICU beds is at or above the threshold
level, then no quarantine is required. If the number of ICU beds is below the
threshold, then quarantine of the HR population only can allow the country
14
to slow the spread of disease and flatten the curve. In the meantime, the LR
group can support the economy while maintaining pandemic interventions.
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β(H) β(R) β(D) γ(H) γ(R) γ(D) δ(H) δ(D) pi
k = 1 1.0 98.95 0.05 10.0 89.0 1.0 80.0 20.0 90.0
k = 2 5.0 94.5 0.5 20.0 78.0 2.0 60.0 40.0 80.0
Table 1: 2-SEIR parameters in percent, 1→ LR, 2→ HR.
β(H) β(R) β(D) γ(H) γ(R) γ(D) δ(H) δ(D) pi
k = 1 0.5 99.50 0.0 2.0 87.0 1.0 95.0 5.0 50.0
k = 2 1.0 98.95 0.05 10.0 89.0 1.0 90.0 10.0 90.0
k = 3 4.0 95.5 0.5 15.0 84.0 1.0 70.0 30.0 80.0
k = 4 10.0 85.0 5.0 25.0 72.0 3.0 50.0 50.0 80.0
Table 2: 4-SEIR parameters in percent, 1→ C, 2→ LR, 3→ HR, 4→ NH.
Figure 1: Flow chart for the SEIR model.
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